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When Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr . ,  died in 1935, he left the bulk of his 
estate to the United States Government. 
This gift, known as the Oliver Wendell 
Hnlmes Devise, sat in the Treasury for 
about twenty years, until Congress set up 
a Presidential Commission to determine 
what to do with i t .  The principal use of 
the money has been to fund a multi- 
volume History of the United States 
Supreme Court. The history of the 
project itself has not always been a happy 
one, for some of the authors have been 
unable to complete their volumes. 
Among them was one of my teachers, 
the late Paul Freund, who was the first 
general editor of the project and also 
planned to write the volume on the 
period in which Charles Evans Hughes 
was Chief Justice, from 1930 to 1941. 
1 have had the good fortune to receive the 
succeeding assignment to write this 
volume. 
I feel fortunate to be part of the Devise 
History not only because it places me in 
a wonderful neighborhood of authors, 
but also because it  is a tremendously 
important prosect; its period of gestation 
has been very long. but so will be its 
shelf-life. And I feel particularly fortunate 
to have the Hughes Court assignment not 
only because 1 have already spent 
considerable time studying the Hughes 
Court - In what seems like a prior life. 
I \note a dissertation on Hughes as Chief 
Justice - but also because of the 
importance of the period. For the Court, 
as for society at large, this was an era of 
enormous turmoil and transformation. 
Indeed, I believe it was "The Crucible of 
the Modem Constitution." That, at any 
rate, will be the subtitle of my ~ ~ o l u m e .  
The period began with what has been 
called the old constitutionalism still 
apparently dominant, continued through 
the crisis that culminated in the struggle 
over Franklin Roosevelt's plan to pack 
the Court in 1937, and ended as the 
Justices appointed by Roosevelt consoli- 
dated their hold on the Court and on the 
dramatically new constitutionalism that 
still prevails. 
,/ or the Court, as for 
society at large, this was 
era of enormous turmoil and 
nsformation. Indeed, I believe 
it was "The Crucible of the 
Modem Constitution." 
So I have a story to tell and a mysten 
to solve. The story is of how this transfor- 
mation was achieved. And at the heart of 
the s t o n  lies this myster).: In the spring 
of 1937, shortly after Roosevelt's land- 
slide re-election victory and during the 
height of the Court-packing battle, the 
Court seemed suddenly to become more 
liberal. To what extent, if any, did these 
political factors account for this apparent 
suitch? But implicit in this question, as 
I have phrased it, is another: To what 
extent was there actually a suitch? 
At the broadest level, of course there 
was: Constitutional law was far different 
in 1941 from what it was in 1930. 
Indeed, the old constitutionalism \\.as 
effectively dead as soon as Roo~e\~elt's 
appointees began to replace the consera-  
tive Four Horsemen in the fall of 1937. 
Liberal decisions resulting from these 
personnel changes do not represent a 
response by the Court to political 
pressure; the new Justices were part of 
the victorious side of 1936, not its 
cowered foes. But because these person- 
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nel changes occufred so soon after the -- 
Court-packing battle concluded, they 
may make it harder to discern what the 
Court's reaction to political pressure was. 
Certainly, in the spring of 1937, while 
the battle was hot, the Court issued a 
flurry of significant decisions reaching 
liberal results, far different from the 
results of an earlier flurry of significant 
decisions in 1936. The most important 
cases break down into three sets, which 
we may refer to as the minimum wage, 
general welfare, and commerce clause 
cases. In 1936, in Morehead v. New York 
ex rel. Tipaldo, the Court held a state 
minimum wage law invalid; but the next 
year, in West Coast Hate2 Co. v. Panish, 
the Court upheld such a law in overturn- 
ing the precedent on which Morehead 
was based. In 1936, in United States v. 
Butler, the Court held that the Agricul- 
tural Adjustment Act had exceeded the 
federal government's ~ o w e i  to tax and 
spend, but in the Social Security Cases of 
1937 the Court upheld the exercise of 
those powers in the Social Securiry Act. 
In 1936, in Carter v. Carter coal Co., 
the Court held invaw a Congressional 
attempt under the commerce clause to 
regulate labor relations in a basic produc- 
tive industry, but in 1937, in NLRB v. 
J a r s  & hughlin Steel Corp., the Court 
fipheld a f i r  armore mveepIng zqyiatioa of 
labor relations, a h  under the cmmerae 
power. 
These developments were draznaic, 
but we must be mti s in concluding 
whether, or to whn &t, the 1937 
decisions represented a &den adoption 
of a new ideology. I b e l i e  that. to 
answer these questions q u i r e s  a great 
deal of attention to the grubby details of 
individual Justices and individual cases. 
It is tempting to think of the Court - 
organically, as an institution that moves ' 
and makes strategic decisions like an 
army. Perhaps this model is an qppropri- 
ate portrayal of the Court when John 
Marshall dominated it. But it does not 
come close to reflecting the Court of early 
1937. Obviously, the Court as a whole, 
acting in conference, could not have been 
a strategic decisionmaker; it was too 
badly divided; There were blocs on the 
court, four Justices on the right and three 
an the left, that held informal caucuses at 
which they presumably discussed tactics 
for conference>.But even assurmng each 
bloc remained cohesive (which was not 
always so) neither could p r d  in any ' 
case without support tram the middle; 
the conservative Four Horsemen needed 
the vote of either Chief Justice Hugha ar 
Owen Roberts, and the liberals needed 
both their votes. 
If there ivai a strategic decision&, 
therefore, it would have had to be one elf 
these two Justices*-me h v e  thought 
that this was a role played by.Hughrs. He 
was, after all, E e  Chief Justice, he was a 
commanding figure, ahd he itood 
ideologically near the center of the Court. 
But there is no basis for concluding that 
he had strategic control over the Court, 
and there is sound reasdn for concluding 
that he did not. Indeed, Justice Brandeis 
told Felix Frankurter at a crucial moment 
that Hughes was depressed becauqe he 
had no control over the Court. Before the 
crisis, Hughes was in the dissent in too 
many cases of political sigmf&nce to 
suppose that he had any real measure of 
control. Hughes. did not solicit his 
colleagues for votes, and he seems to 
have taken an austere view of his role and 
the decisionmaking process of the Court: 
The Justices each had their say in confer- 
ence, they voted, and they moved on to 
the next case. 
Then how about Justice Roberts? He 
was not in strategic control of the Court; 
he controlled no one's vate but own, 
and he does not seem to have had 
significant persuasive power over his 
colleaeues. But certainly Roberts had a 
Hughes and Roberts, rrspmded to 
pblitical presmm than it would be to 
draw such generalizations from the 
propositian that the Court responded to 
such pressure. 
In understanding what happened, 
phrasing the question in terms of the 
C O ~  rather than of Junice Roberts and 
Chief Justice Hughes probably would 
make little difference if we could reliably 
think of decisions by the Court under 
this model: Any issue is represented by a 
point on a continuum runnikg [om Left 
to right, and the Justices by fixed links in 
a rigid chain, running from left to right 
with Roberts in the middle. If the chain 
comes down with five ar more links to 
the left of the critical point, then the 
liberals win, and otherwise the conserva- 
tives win. 
Now, this model does have some 
explanatory power, because it rests 
implicitly on two premises that are 
usually true. First, judges tend to act 
consistently on a given issue. Thus, if 
Justice A is more conservative (whatever 
that may mean) than Justice B on issue 1 
on one occasion, chances are strong that, 
absent samething unusual happening, 
A will be more conservative than B on 
issue 1 on another occasion. Second, 
there is a substantial correlation between 
great degree of control over the Court's 
decisions, kcaw on many significaw 
issues he was the man in the-middle, the 
Justice most likely to join the conserva- 
tive fou~ to-make a majority. 
The then, should not be 
phrased as whether, or to what extent, 1 the ~ i u r t  was affected by political 
pressure. The key question ishvhether 
certain issues. That is, if we know that A is 
more conservative h , B  on issue 1, we 
may d be able to predict how they will 
stand in relation to one another on issue 2. 
TZle trouble is that neither of these 
premises is inevitably true - or any- 
where close. Each Justice is subject to his 
own set of influences, and they may 
differ, in a multivariate way, from one 
Justice to another. (The masculine 
gender, by the hey, is appropriate for the 
Court of the 1930s.) This means that the 
Justices cannot be put on a simple 
continuum. The problem for analysis is 
in part, but not only, that a given justice 
may be more liberal on some issues, 
relative to his colleagues, than on other 
issues. The more difficult aspect of the 
problem is that any Justice, even one who 
seems moderate on most issues, might be 
affected to a substantial extent by a given 
factor that seems far less imponant to his 
colleagues. If one nevertheless knew with 
confidence the full panoply of a given 
Justice's views on matters coming before 
the Court, then one d d  test whether 
hls votes and opinions consistently 
reflected those views. But such confi- 
dence is, of course, difficult to attain. 
To a large extent, a Justice's views are 
revealed only through those votes and 
opinions themselves. And this creates at 
least three signifcant dfficulties. 
' Justice Roberts was affected by political 
pressure; a subsidiary question is 
whether Chief Justice Hughes, who also 
might be thought to have done some 
switching in 1937, was so affected. To 
adapt t e r n  used by Graham Allison in 
his celebzated study, Essmce of Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, if we 
want to anderstand the Court's course of 
decisions, we are better off dealing not 
within Model 11, treating the Court as a 
monolithic entity, bur within Model 111, 
emphasizing the roles of the individual 
players. 
1 emphasize this point not just out of 
persnicketiness. It is important both for 
understanding what tnppenbd in 1937 
and for assessing its s@icance. First, 
as to the assessment of significance: 
Suppose that what I shall call the political 
hypothesis - that political pf iu%e 
explains the course. of decisions - 
appears to be correct. It is probably far 
more difficult to draw hhtorically 
interesting genemlizations from the 
proposition dmt -Roberts, or perhaps 
C 
Most obvious perhaps is a large 
problem of circularity. Suppose that a 
Justice votes on the conservative side of 
Case 1 and on the liberal side of Case 2. 
This does not necessarily mean that 
anything strange happened, or that the 
Justice must have responded to political 
pressure between the two cases - even if 
it so happens that a political event that 
might be thought to have created left- 
ward pressure occurred during that 
internal. It  might be that there is a 
distinction between the two cases that 
made the liberal side appear more 
persuasive in Case 2 than in Case 1; to a 
large extent, the business of appellate 
judgng, and the method by which judge- 
made law grows, consists of distinguish- 
ing cases, invoking a given doctrine in 
one case but not in another because of 
material differences between the cases. 
But if the political factor also provides a 
plausible explanation for the pair of 
votes, it may be difficult to know 
whether this substantive distinction 
between the two cases really was a 
significant factor motivating the Justice's 
conduct. 
The same points apply to sets of cases. 
Suppose a Justice has a batch of conser- 
vative votes in one time period and a 
batch of liberal votes in a later time 
period. This might be because a political 
factor intervened, and some historians 
seem to regard this inference - that the 
Justice altered his ideological stance, at 
least temporarily - as inevitable. But it is 
not. Just as a fair coin will sometimes be 
flipped heads three times in a row and 
then tails three times in a row, a Justice 
acting conscientiously might decide a run 
of cases on one side of the line and then a 
second run on the other side. 
Second, even putting aside political 
factors, simply because creative lawyering 
can expose a potentially material distinc- 
tion between two cases, it by no means 
follows that this is a difference that 
actually persuaded the individual Justice 
in question. I have suggested that some 
factor that might appear relatively 
unimportant to most Justices, or most 
observers, may appear critical to one 
Justice. If we are lucky, we may be able 
to discern these, but I do not think we 
always can. I find it very interesting that 
in 1946, when Merlo Pusey, in the course 
of preparing his prize-winning biography 
of Hughes, asked Roberts to account for 
his conduct in the minimum wage cases, 
Roberts' "initial, semifacetious reply", as 
Pusey characterized i t ,  was: "Who knows 
what causes a judge to decide as he does? 
Maybe the breakfast he had has some- 
thing to do with it." And it may well be 
that, in the case of Roberts especially, no 
matter how deeply and accurately we 
may analyze the factors motivating a 
Justice's decisions, we will be left with a 
residue of apparent randomness - a 
degree to which, though some consistent 
set of factors might be at work, it will be 
essentially impossible for us to recognize 
what they are. There is a significant irony 
here, I think: To the extent that such 
factors as the Justice's breakfast help 
explain conduct that might otherwise 
appear inconsistent, a political explana- 
tion is not necessary. 
Finally, because of the group nature of 
the Court's work, its opinions provide 
only a limited insight into the beliefs of a 
particular Justice. The Hughes Court was 
sharply divided, of course, but as com- 
pared to the modern Court it was much 
less fragmented; often there was a 
dissent, but in contrast to today cases in 
which there were more than two opin- 
ions were relatively rare. Ordinarily, a 
Justice would go along with an opinion 
that reached the result he favored, 
without feeling the need to write sepa- 
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& -  believe that, notwithstanding these difficulties, Hughes' 
rately simply because he did not agree 
with every statement contained in the 
opinion. Thus, to a large extent a Justice 
had two principal options in any given 
case - to join the majority or to dissent 
- and the Justice's vote does not in itself 
give more information than which of 
those two options he preferred; a Justice's 
concurrence in an opinion did not 
demonstrate that he agreed with it in its 
entirety. Of course, the Justice's own 
opinions are a better guide to his views, 
but at times the author might be willing 
to alter the text to make sure that he 
retained the concurrence of his col- 
leagues. 
I believe that, notwithstanding these 
difficulties, Hughes' judicial ide~lo~gy can 
be mapped out in some detail. On some 
issues, he was very liberal: In the general 
area of civil rights and civil liberties, I 
believe there was no member of the 
Court more liberal. Nearly as strong a 
statement could be made with respect to 
the question of the power of the state to 
regulate prices, including wages, and to 
overcome private contractual arrange- 
ments. (I put aside the troublesome 
question of why ludicial activism is 
generally considered liberal when what 
are deemed to be civil rights or civil 
liberties are at issue, but conservative 
when asserted rights against state eco- 
judicial ideology can be mapped out in some detail. On some 
issues, he was very liberal: In the general area of civil rights 
and civil liberties, I believe there was no member of the 
Court more liberal. Nearly as strong a statement could be 
made with respect to the question of the power of the state 
to regulate prices, including wages, and to overcome 
private contractual arrangements. 
nomic power are at issue.) When the 
reach of the federal government's po\vers 
was at stake, he still tended to be liberal 
- that is, hospitable to such power - 
though more cautiously so. On many tas 
matters, however, he was far more 
conservative, sometimes voting to the 
right of Justice Roberts, and he was 
similarly consenTative when he believed 
freedom of individual opportunity uTas at 
stake. And certain issues seemed to 
matter to him so much that they could 
make him appear, in some contests, to be 
one of the most conservative members of 
the Court. More than any other Justice, it 
seems, he was willing to put weight on 
constitutional restrictions against delega- 
tion of legslative authority; Brandeis 
reported that he nras "crazy" about 
confiscation; and he had a distinctive, 
highly judicialized lieu. of proper 
administration. 
Furthermore, I believe that, with an 
understanding of Hughes' views, we can 
state uith a rather high degree of confi- 
dence that his votes were not affected by 
political factors, either the public reaction 
to the Court's decisions, or the Roose~relt 
landslide of 1936, or the Court-packing 
battle. I have presented a rather full 
arpment else\vhere, in an article entitled 
S~ritcl~iltg Timc and 0 t h ~ ~ -  TI~ougJzt 
E~pcrimcnts: T k  H~rghcs Court and 
Constitutional T~~ansfonnation, 142 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 189 1 (199-t), and will summarize 
it briefly here. 
Any case for a snitch must be based 
primarily on the three sets of cases I have 
described above - the minimum wage, 
general welfare, and commerce clause 
cases. Hughes clearly did not snitch in 
the minimum wage cases; he had been in 
the liberal minority in MOT-cltcad in 1936, 
and the views that he established as law 
in \Arcst Coast Hotcl case in 1937 were 
ones that he had long espoused. Nor was 
there a substantive switch for Hughes in 
the "general welfare" cases. In Butlcl- in 
1936, he had voted against the particular 
esercise of the Government's tasing and 
spending power there at issue, an aspect 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that 
appeared coercive to him. But he clearly 
favored the expansive general statement 
of the Government's power in Roberts' 
opinion for the majority; this, too, 
echoed a view that he had long held. 
Indeed, Roberts later told Felix Frank- 
furter that he had included that dictum 
"just to please the Chief." In the Social 
Security Cases of 1937, Hughes favored 
the exercise of the spending power - 
but these were much stronger cases for 
the Government, and so they appeared 
not only to Hughes and Roberts but also 
to two of the four conservative Justices, 
Van Devanter and Sutherland. 
As for the commerce clause cases, it 
appears to me that Hughes' opinion for a 
bare majority of the Court inJones C 
Laughlin in 1937 is not genuinely consis- 
tent with the commerce aspect of his 
separate opinion the previous year in 
Carter, at least not according to any 
reasoning that commanded Hughes' 
conscientious adherence. But it is Carter, 
not Jones G Laughlin, that is the aberra- 
tion. The discussion of the commerce 
power inJones G LaughIin is written in 
Hughes' most magmerial and expansive 
style, and it is consistent with the entire 
sweep of his career, going back to his 
days as an Associate Justice. The com- 
merce passage in Hughes' Carter opinion, 
by contrast, is brief, conclusory, and 
cryptic, and unnecessary given the way 
he would have resolved the case. I 
suspect it did not represent his genuine 
views, and that he inserted it for some 
political motive. His commerce discus- 
sion in Carter ended with what was in 
effect a plea to the public to get off the 
backs of the Court, amending the 
Constitution if the Court's interpretation 
of the commerce power seemed intoler- 
able; this advertisement, I believe, may 
have provided the motivation for Hughes' 
skimpy substantive discussion, rather 
than vice versa. In any event, there is no 
basis for concluding that Hughes was 
pushed into Jones G Laughlin by 
political pressure. 
As for Roberts, I can not speak with 
nearly so much confidence. This is in 
part because I have not spent as much 
time studylng Roberts. But it is also, I 
suspect, because to a certain extent 
Roberts defies understanding. His views 
were not as well settled as Hughes', and 
they appear to have been considerably 
more idiosyncratic. Thus, his views seem 
to have changed over time, and even 
without a significant passage of time he 
acted in ways that would appear to most 
observers as inconsistent; inconsistency 
in the eyes of others, however, might 
mean simply that Roberts was motivated 
by factors that appeared more important 
to him than to others. 
I do have some conclusions, which I 
have explored more fully in the Switching 
Time article, regarding Roberts and the 
political hypothesis. Roberts' conduct in 
the minimum wage cases was strange, 
and his later explanation of it does not 
fully hold up. He joined the conservatives 
in Morehead and the liberals in West Coast 
Hotel, and later asserted that he did so 
because in the latter case, but not the 
former, the question of whether to 
overrule the precedent that most strongly 
\upported the conscnratlves was not 
I~rcsentccl This IS not so, at lc'lst argu- 
, 1 1 ~ 1 \ ~ ,  [ l in t  clucstlnn was actually presented 
~-i;o~-e c1ca1-ly by counscl In Morchcad But 
I [hlnk that ~t IS a1 least clear that Roberts' 
\otc In \\'N Coact Hotc'l, and not the one 
In ,!/lor t-hcncl, reflected h ~ s  pre\r~ously 
c\prcsscd substant~ve irlews Why he was 
i o  much readier In Wcct Coact Hotcl to 
ojVcrcome any proceclurnl scruples that 
Iind prevented hlm from jolnlng the 
Ilberals In Morchcad IS not SO clear He 
Inny have dec~ded that he was wrong on 
~hls  matter, or that the conservat~ves had 
['ken advantage of hlm And he may 
11we been shaken by the furlous publlc 
rc'xctlon to Morcllcad. But the tlmlng of 
the Court's act~ons In \Vcct Coast Hotcl, 
among other factors, suggests that nelther 
the 1936 electlon nor the Court-packlng 
battle had anythlng to do wlth the 
matter 
Roberts' votes In the "general welfare" 
cases can probably be esplalned In the 
same way that Hughes', as well as those 
of Van Devanter and Sutherland, can - 
the Soc~al Secunty Cases appeared to be 
stronger ones for the Government than 
Butlcr d ~ d  Roberts appears to have been 
slgnlhcantly less enthused about the 
federal spendlng power than Hushes 
was, el-en at the tlme Roberts wrote 
broadl). about ~t In Butler, and on the 
commerce clause hls record on the Court 
before 1937 was far more consenratlve 
than Hughes' The most notable, but not 
the only lllustratlon of t h ~ s  1s Roberts' 
concurrence wlth the majonty In Car-tcr. 
I am ~nclined, therefore, to belleve that 
Roberts' concurrence with the liberal stde 
of the Court ~n]orlcs G Latcghl~n repre- 
sented a break lor hlm But there 1s no 
reason to doubt ~ t s  lncenty, Roberts was 
capable of changing h ~ s  mlnd on short 
order, h ~ s  ButIcr op~nlon suggests that he 
was then beglnnlng to expand 111s llews of 
nat~onal powers, and hls later conduct 
showed no resenations about Jorles &+ 
L n u ~ h l i n .  Apart from the timing, there is no 
reason to believe that the Court-packing 
plan influenced Rohens, and there is good 
reason to believe it did not: It was not 
immediately clear what the political impact 
of upholding the National Labor Relations 
Act would be, and the Government's 
victory was far more sweeping that one 
might cspect if the decision was inconsis- 
tent with Roberts' conscientious beliefs but 
motivated by a manipulative desire to help 
defeat Court-packing. Perhaps the storm of 
sitdown strikes then compelling national 
attention made Roberts belie1.e that a 
national solution to labor problems was 
necessary, but I do not believe it is possible 
to be sure. 
I have said that I aim to tell a story, 
but 1 have not promised that it would be 
a simple, neat story. I t  \till not satisfy 
those who wish to \riew the Court as an 
ordinary political institution, subject to 
ordinary political pressures. Nor \$ill it 
gratify those ~ v h o  are committed to the 
view that no Justice could have been 
affected by such pressures. And it may 
discomfit those who ~irould like to draw 
conclusions about the Court of the 
Hughes era without doing the hard \trork 
of esamining the particulars of the cases 
it decided, and tning to do so with the 
mindset of the individuals who happened 
to constitute the Court. But I hope that it 
will yield us a fuller picture than we now 
have of how it happened that the Hughes 
Court transformed American constitu- 
tional lalv. 
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Professor R~chard Fiicdmnti jo1 ncd 
thcfacultv in 1988. His rcscarch 
focuses on olldcnce, antitnlst, 
and Supremc Court history. 
He is gencral editor nf The New 
W~gmore. n m~tlti-\*oIumc tr-catisc 
on o~idcnce no\v in preparation. 
